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Understanding prevention policy: 
A theoretical approach 
Professor Ian Gough 
London School of Economics 
 
‘Nowhere is there agreement about quite what prevention is, while 
everywhere there is agreement that it is a good thing’ (Freeman 1992: 
47) 
 
Prevention is almost entirely seen as a good thing. So long as the subject 
at which it is aimed is negatively connotated, for example ill health, poverty 
or child abuse, it becomes a ‘unifying slogan’ which is attractive, politically 
appealing and apparently without controversy (Billis 1981, Wattam 1999). 
But Freeman reminds us that despite this consensus there is no consensus 
on what prevention actually is. In this paper I try to stand back and consider 
this question. 
 
The paper is concerned only with prevention in public policy. The whole 
range of preventive activity by individuals, households, businesses, 
community and third sector bodies is not discussed; though evidently it 
impacts on and is impacted by government prevention policy. Some current 
policies seek to incentivise private preventive activity, but it is only the 
public policy with which this paper is concerned. 
 
A quick online search of various combinations of ‘prevention’, 'social theory' 
and 'social policy' shows that preventive discourses dominate in crime, 
child and adolescent behaviour, family problems, alcoholism and drug use; 
numerous health conditions, physical and mental, and therapies; cognitive 
learning, educational achievement, early years intervention and passages 
into employment. Other policy areas where they feature strongly are 
development policy and overseas aid programmes, and the whole range of 
environmental policies. 
 
A distinctive feature of the nef report The Wisdom of Prevention (Coote 
2012) is to analyse prevention across the spheres of society, economy and 
environment. It recognises that these spheres are inextricably and 
increasingly linked and interdependent, and must be addressed together to 
plan for a sustainable future. I shall follow that precept here and try to 
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survey social policy, climate change policy and economic policy. We shall 
see that each poses quite different questions and frameworks for thinking 
about prevention. While the prevention framework is explicitly applied in 
social policy and environmental policy, it is much less prominent in thinking 
on economic policy. Yet it can be shown that effective prevention in both 
the social and environmental domains depends on a major re-orientation of 
the current economic paradigm. I will therefore address prevention in social 
and environmental policy first before turning to the economy.1  
 
The first section below sets out a conceptual framework. The next three 
sections look in turn at prevention in social policy, climate change policy 
and economic policy. The final section offers some very brief concluding 
thoughts. As a consequence the paper is extremely broad and synoptic; I 
hope that the gains from such an overview outweigh the many gaps and 
lacks in the paper. 
 
A conceptual framework 
Some definitions 
The dictionary defines prevention as stopping something (usually 
unpleasant) from happening. This definition is rather crude – it is all or 
nothing; either threat or risk X is stopped or it is not. For this reason, 
‘prevention’ is not used in connection to climate change because a 
considerable degree of global warming cannot be prevented: it is an inbuilt 
consequence of past emissions and destruction of carbon sinks. Here the 
favoured term is mitigation, referring to all measures to reduce the intensity 
of radiative forcing and thus global warming. A more useful alternative 
definition of prevention is ‘to reduce the probability of downside risks’ 
(Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001), in which case it could be applied to 
measures to reduce climate change. We must be careful when using these 
different terminologies. 
 
It is common in social policy to go on and identify different forms of 
prevention, usually distinguishing three, and usually labelling these primary, 
secondary and tertiary. Table 1 shows various definitions of these three 
levels (see also Coote 2012, Table 1). There are similarities but they are 
not identical, so care must be exercised when using the terms. Secondary 
prevention in particular can mean either identifying at-risk groups and 
targeting interventions at them; or mitigating the impact of ‘downside’ risks 




                                               
1 There is a fourth sphere: national security interventions. It is possible to 
identify certain preventive strategies here, such as international treaties, 
foreign aid and ‘soft power’ as alternatives to military power. I say no more 
about this here. 
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Table 1: Varying definitions of primary, secondary and tertiary forms of prevention 
 
 Primary Secondary: Tertiary 
General (Coote 2012 ‘Upstream’: Prevent harm before 
it occurs, usually focusing on 
whole populations and systems 
‘Midstream’: Mitigate the 
effects of harm that has 
already happened; focus on 
groups at risk 
‘Downstream’: Cope with 
the consequences of 
harm, stop things from 
getting worse 
World Bank: Social risk 
management (Holzmann and 
Jorgensen 2001:541-2 
Prevention: reduce the probability 
of a downside risk 
Mitigation: reduce the 
potential impact of a future 
down-side risk 
Coping: Relieve the 
impact of the risk once it 
has occurred 
Health (OECD 2009; NPHP 
2006) 
Prevent the onset of undesirable 
states 
Early stage disease detection 
and interventions 
Minimise impact of 
disease 
Crime (Brantigham and Faust 
1976) 
Reduce crime events by modify 
the physical and/or social 
environment 
Identify at risk populations 
and potential  criminals and 
address the causal risk factors 
Stop criminals committing 
more crime, eg  via 
imprisonment 
Social work (Hardiker et al 
1991) 
Prevent the emergence of a 
problem 
Early identification of 
problem; amelioration and 
containment of serious 
problems 




Theories of prevention 
These are notable for their absence. In two papers Richard Freeman (1992 
and 1999) undertakes ‘a self-conscious attempt to theorise a domain of 
activity which is often left undertheorised’ (1999: 233). He argues that 
prevention is a product of modernity, being bound up with the welfare state 
and the authority of professional and scientific expertise. Prevention policy 
is built on two basic foundations, both of which are contested concepts. 
First, scientific understandings of cause and effect and the possibility of 
prediction. Notwithstanding relativist and post-modern critiques, and 
historical shifts in paradigms in both the natural and social sciences, it is 
indisputable in my view that there has indeed been a broad historical 
improvement in our understanding of the determinants of welfare and need 
satisfaction in numerous domains of life (Doyal and Gough 1991). Second, 
prevention policy presumes some capacity for controlled intervention by 
government in social life.  
 
Again I would argue that the broad historical expansion of public 
administration in modern societies cannot be denied, as Mann (1993) has 
established in his account of the rise of political- administrative power since 
the eighteenth century, including the size, scope and bureaucratisation of 
the modern state.  
 
If we have established the basic parameters of prevention and recognised 
the variety of preventive policies, what factors explain which dominant 
strategies are adopted by particular governments in particular policy areas 
at particular times? This is a big question! I will approach it by building on 
historical and comparative welfare state scholarship over the past four 
decades. This literature has identified five factors or drivers of social policy 
development in the West over the last century. I call these the ‘five I’s’ of 
Industrial capitalism, Interests, Institutions, Ideas/Ideologies, and 
International Influences (Gough 2008, Gough and Therborn 2011). Though 
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developed to explain social policies I believe it can be applied to the 
contemporary emergence of environmental policies (Gough forthcoming). 
In this paper I will focus on Ideas, Interests and Institutions in seeking to 
understand the development and pattern of modern preventive public 
policies. 
 
Ideas and ideologies. 
Freeman notes that his definition of prevention presupposes some value 
consensus on the nature of cause and effect in social science and on the 
intervention capacities of modern government. But he observes right away 
that in understanding the social world there are contending theories with 
different notions of causality and with different implications for policy. In 
numerous areas of social policy there is contention: between structural and 
individual approaches, between contextual and rational actor models, 
between medical and social explanations, etc. Alongside these sometimes 
epistemological differences, there are the sheer empirical challenges of 
identifying causality in complex models. Further contention arises around 
intervention strategies. For example, social statistics in epidemiology and 
criminology relate to populations and probabilities, which make for 
controversy over the legitimacy of preventive interventions with respect to 
actual individuals (1992: 36). 
 
Thus the role of ideas and ideologies – clusters of views on the nature of 
the world and normative beliefs about what governments can and should 
do – is central. We shall see that ideological predispositions and conflicting 
paradigms shape the goals, scope and nature of preventive strategies. 
Prevention is by no means intrinsically ‘progressive’. For example, youth 
crime can be prevented by fortifying public buildings and introducing metal 
detectors in schools; or by neighbourhood development programmes and 
more holistic programmes to promote child wellbeing (Hayward 2007, 
France et al 2010). Obesity can be reduced by stomach stapling operations 
or by regulating sectors of the food industry or numerous interventions 
between these two. Harm from prospective climate change can be reduced 
by reducing emissions or by adapting infrastructures or behaviours. 
Preventive strategies are highly contested, and will be shaped by dominant 
paradigms in society. 
 
Institutions 
Next, the nature of public policies, including preventive public policies, are 
shaped by institutions. These include the nature of political systems, their 
form of political representation, the administrative bureaucracies of modern 
states, and the form of integration of interest groups in the policy making 
process. Three examples. First, representative democracy will favour short-
term policy-making following electoral cycles, militating against longer term 
preventive strategies. Second, the extensive welfare states of the Western 
world have built up powerful ministries which seek to protect their policy 
areas and dislike overarching preventive initiatives. Third, these in turn 
bequeath policy legacies, commitments and path dependencies: welfare 
states constrain and pre-empt resources being applied to prevention due to 
the ‘double fiscal burden’ such investment strategies impose. This 
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Interests 
Behind ideas often lurk different organised interests. These include the 
professions created by and dominant in welfare states, including medical, 
economics, pedagogical etc. They also include the dominant economic 
actors of business and trades unions. The power of the latter has 
diminished within Western countries, but the power of corporate and 
financial interests has clearly grown, reflecting both their structural power 
and their ‘voice’ in modern polities. In social policy two lobbies are 
important: those sectors supplying inputs to state services, which cover a 
growing range from producing drugs to running care homes and prisons; 
and those whose products cause harms to health or wellbeing which social 
policies try to ameliorate. Both wield considerable power alongside 
professions to shape prevention policy. In climate change policy, industrial 
and commercial interests play a big role in opposing or supporting 
mitigation programmes. 
 
Behind all these are the restless, relatively unplanned processes of socio-
economic change, including economic growth and transformation, new 
inequalities, regional and local spatial changes, demographic shifts, new 
forms of family life, etc. These provide the seed ground of new issues and 
‘puzzles’ which continually confront governments as new ‘social problems’. 
These background structural changes stretch to embrace global shifts in 
capitalism, trade and financial flows and migration. But I will not stretch this 
paper that far and will take these as given.  
Thus the above framework provides a checklist to which I will refer when 
seeking to explain preventive policies in different areas 
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Social policy and prevention 
Social policy is a major site of contemporary debates and policy innovations 
concerning prevention, and has fostered a wide range of studies and 
research. I shall here briefly survey health, crime and early years 
intervention. 
Health 
‘Socio-environmental change is costly, radical and unpredictable, whereas 
health education is cheap, uncontroversial and safe’ (Freeman 1992: 44) 
 
This paper cannot go into the history of preventive health initiatives in the 
UK. The founding idea of the NHS was preventive but the reality was utterly 
dominated by treatment. Preventive initiatives emerged under Labour in the 
1970s (eg. DHSS 1976) but were side-lined by the Thatcher and Major 
governments, which became preoccupied with continually reorganising the 
NHS to introduce market principles. However, pressure by the Health 
Education Council, Chief Medical Officer and various reviews such as the 
Wanless Reports (2002, 2004) continually raised new initiatives alongside 
the NHS, so to speak: restraining smoking and alcohol being two consistent 
themes (Allsop and Freeman 1993). Also as the cost of the treatment-
oriented NHS has mounted there has been growing interest in the cost-
containment potential of effective health prevention. The Wanless Reports 
and NICE reports document the ‘significant short, medium and long-term 
savings to the service and to the taxpayer’ that promoting good health and 
preventing ill-health could achieve (Knapp et al 2011 provides a recent 
example). The New Labour government developed a more coherent 
preventive health strategy beginning with the pathbreaking 1998 Green 
Paper Our Healthier Nation and put in place some initiatives to implement 
it. However, this approach was again side-lined soon after when Tony Blair 
announced his 2000 Health Plan to greatly increase expenditure on the 
treatment-oriented NHS. And many of the New Labour preventive initiatives 
have not survived the change of government. 
 
Two interesting theoretical debates have dominated the whole period: 
between different ideologies and between interventions targeted at 
individuals or social structures. 
 
First, the very idea of preventing ill-health could be seen as a Fabian one, 
entailing proactive government and a degree of ‘social engineering’. The 
New Right or neo-liberal arguments concerning individual liberty and 
consumer sovereignty gained prominence in the later 1970s and have not 
relinquished that position. The ‘nanny state’ slogan has wormed its way into 
the national psyche (Kings Fund 2004). Yet this counter-ideology has not 
removed prevention from the political agenda, rather redefined it in terms of 
altering individual behaviour and life style choice. 
 
Following on from this, the second debate has been between interventions 
targeted at individuals or at social structures. There is much work on 
conceptualising these alternatives; for example the famous 'onion' diagram 
of layers of influence on population health of Dahlgren and Whitehead 
(1991), moving outwards from individual factors, through family, 
community, broader living and working conditions to general socioeconomic 
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and cultural conditions. This relates to the tripartite forms of prevention 
depicted in Table 1. 
 
Those arguing for more structural, primary level interventions have kept up 
a continual presence, from the 1978 WHO Alma Ata declaration, the 1980 
Black Report, the 2010 Marmot Review on health inequalities in England 
and the 2010 Sustainable Development Commission Report on sustainable 
development and health. Sociological arguments are deployed and 
alternative methodologies proposed to identify the ‘pathogenic nature of 
modern social structures’ (Davis 1979). The Marmot Report proposes a 
radical preventive strategy extending to fair employment and good work, a 
healthy standard of living for all, and healthy and sustainable places and 
communities. The SDC advocates addressing the current ‘obesogenic 
environment’ of energy-dense food, motorised transport and sedentary life-
styles. It notes areas of synergy between health and environmental 
sustainability, in food, transport, green spaces and built environment. The 
current obsession with economic growth also features as a block to radical 
prevention of ill-health, and alternative measures of well-being are 
promulgated. All this amounts to a more or less coherent structural 
preventive health strategy; but so far it has had little traction. A set of 
concrete proposals to tackle the numerous obstacles listed above has been 
advanced by the Kings Fund (2004). 
 
The dominant strand of primary preventive intervention has been 
biomedical (eg statins), early years interventions (eg immunisation, nutrition 
during pregnancy) and health education and life style change (eg smoking 
cessation) (Allsop and Freeman 1992). In addition there has been a much 
greater focus on secondary prevention by identifying and targeting at-risk 
groups. 
 
Can the framework presented earlier explain the subaltern role of 
prevention in health policy and the dominance of individualist interventions? 
I briefly consider some of the arguments. 
Ideological and epistemological 
It is difficult to gather clear evidence of the effectiveness of primary preventive 
health measures, particularly those that accrue in the medium term or long term. 
Both biomedical science and economics (the dominant epistemic community in 
social science) favour targeting individual bodies and individual behaviours. The 
search is for individual pathogens rather than the social context of disease. Both 
have advocated the methodology of randomised control trials (RCT) in order to 
identify groups at risk and effective therapies (Davis 1979). The role of medical 
sociology has been side-lined, and with it alternative, contextual methods to 
evaluate different policies (Asthana and Halliday 2006; Mays, Pope and Popay 
2005). 
Institutions 
The institutional structures of health and the governance structures of 
modern capitalist societies weaken the scope for structurally-oriented 
preventive health. The powerfully organised medical professions around 
the NHS continually reproduce a political constituency advocating and 
favouring curative therapies. Managerial reforms coupled with progressive 
privatisation of some functions have if anything weakened the capacity to 
deliver preventive health measures (Kings Fund 2004). A wide range of 
departments have indirect impacts on health, including  employment, tax, 
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business, agriculture and transport. But because prevention could be 
everybody’s business it is likely to be nobody’s (House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee 1977). 
Interests 
 Outside government are two powerful business lobbies. One, representing 
drugs and medical suppliers, campaign for preventive measures that 
represent profitable niches to supply goods and services (see Foote and 
Blewett 2003 on the USA). This also includes private insurers and health 
providers, such as BUPA, which advocate regular screening (sometimes 
coupled with patient selection). A second, representing businesses 
producing potentially health-harming products, lobby assiduously to prevent 
effective prevention, as with the current arrangements for ‘self-regulation’ in 
the food and drinks industry (Allsop and Freeman 1992). A final sector with 
a powerful impact on prevention is the media. For a variety of reasons the 
media publicise dramatic curative events and health ‘crises’ of various 
sorts, and give very low prominence to public and preventive health: no 
illness or crisis, no story! (Kings Fund 2004). 
 
Thus, notwithstanding the ethical and economic arguments for upstream 
prevention, the dominant discourses, backed by powerful interests and 
institutions, has blocked any significant switch in priorities. New Labour did 
increase the share of preventive health spending during its term in power, 
but it was dwarfed by the overall NHS budget and retains a low share of 
3.6% of total health expenditure (OECD 2009). Past and current trends to 
privatisation, contracting-out, quasi-markets and plural providers have 
generated a new strategy of payment-by-results, which again favours 
outputs that are easily measurable and attributable in the short term. 
Crime 
Crime is another policy area where preventive discourses figure greatly. It 
is also one with quite well established links between ideologies, theories 
and policy recommendations. As in health three forms of crime prevention 
are distinguished as indicated in table 1. 
 
Much of the 20th century was dominated by sociological theories of crime as 
threats to social cohesion meriting just deserts punishment. From the 
1960s onwards this was coupled with dispositional theories asking why 
certain groups committed crimes and research on identifying at risk groups 
and developing secondary forms of prevention. In the 1960s and 1970s a 
critical criminology perspective emerged which situated crime in the context 
of capitalist inequality and a state justice system located within the 
contradictory interests which this threw up. Later a left realist current re-
engaged with older sociological perspectives. 
 
The 1980s saw a rather clear paradigm shift towards a neo-classical 
criminology and rational choice theory (Hayward 2007; Kautt and Pease 
2012). This focused on the ‘rationality’ of certain forms of crime, notably 
theft and burglary, for certain groups building on newer research by Becker 
and Kahnemann among others. The preventive policy derived from this was 
‘situational crime prevention’. This could be defined in a range of ways but 
most attention was focused on fortifying buildings and properties and more 
surveillance using CCTV, internal locking and metal detectors in schools 
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etc. Thus primary prevention was envisaged as modifying the built 
environment, with little attention to the social environment; at the same time 
‘tertiary prevention’ was boosted via a continually rising rate of 
imprisonment. The Coalition government has taken tertiary prevention 
further, instituting a payment-by-results policy - here focused on outcomes 
not outputs - to incentivise ‘offender management’. This harnesses private 
incentives across a range of providers, enabling them to innovate and 
invest money in activities to rehabilitate offenders. It requires a large 
administrative apparatus, measurable and attributable indicators of 
outcomes, systems to track individuals through programmes, and 
monitoring of unforeseen consequences (Nesta 2012), all of which can 
encourage ‘gaming’ by private contractors. 
 
It is possible to link this shift to the model outlined earlier. The model of 
‘technical prevention’ endorses focussed, short-term, cost-effective 
programmes, consistent with individualist rational choice theory. Criminal 
justice and policing institutions play a greater role compared with social 
work and probation: the new ‘Secured by Design’ policy is administered by 
the Association of Chief Police Officers. Furthermore the model provides 
large new profitable opportunities to a burgeoning security industry and 
multinationals like G4S. Indeed Minton and Aked’s paper demonstrates an 
interconnected and self-perpetuating dynamic involving ACPO, private 
security companies and a public standards culture. 
 
This neo-liberal policy continues to be criticised theoretically and 
methodologically arguing that such individualist theories are ‘socially 
deracinated’ (Cohen   ): they ignore social contexts which range from social 
exclusion and marginalised neighbourhoods to values of immediate 
gratification encouraged by late modern consumerism. They also ignore 
value conflicts and ‘expressive crimes’ such as those manifested in the 
2011 riots. 
Early years 
In one sense much of the British welfare state was founded on improving 
life chances in early life, via policies to tackle Beveridge’s ‘five giants’: such 
as housing, employment , income security, health care and education. This 
was echoed in the 1968 Seebohm Report’s notion of ‘general prevention’: 
community wide policies aimed at creating environments conducive to 
social well-being’. But alongside that Seebohm identified ‘specific 
prevention’, aimed at individuals and families in high risk. It is this idea that 
has become so dominant in early years prevention since the 1990s (Smith 
1999). 
In particular early years prevention was taken up by New Labour after 
1997: the Every Child Matters Green Paper and the Children’s Act 2004, 
Sure Start, the Children’s Fund, On Track etc. This linked to the preventive 
strategies in health noted above. The motivation was to prevent or at least 
stem the worsening of a series of social problems including truanting, youth 
crime, poor school achievement and employment prospects, and welfare 
dependency. It was also partly value based – seeking to move away from 
the predominantly punitive strategies of the 1980s and early 1990s – and 
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Risk Factor Analysis became an important tool, imported from the US 
where most initial research was undertaken, in predicting the targets for 
such secondary intervention. This has been criticised on the grounds that 
statistical analysis of correlations and causation cannot take into account 
the influence of social contexts.  It led to the relative neglect of the 
sociological life course approach, of the dangers of stigmatisation, of the 
role of structural factors, and of transactions between individuals and 
contexts (France et al 2010). This ‘empiricist psychometric’ approach 
(Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2005) applies a fortiori to the recent reliance on 
neurological findings on brain growth championed in the recent Early 
Intervention Report authored by Graham Allen (2011; labelled ‘neurotrash’ 
by Bristow 2011). The Coalition government has intensified and adapted 
this secondary prevention approach for the ‘Big Society’ and an era of cuts. 
Critics are also concerned that too much emphasis is now being placed on 
policing families and ‘parenting’ – a neologism reflecting a new and explicit 
arena of policy intervention. 
 
The new economics foundation report Backing the Future (2009) advocates 
an alternative ‘universal and holistic’ preventive system for the early years. 
It advocates, like the Marmot report, a universal plus targeted approach. It 
draws on cross-national research suggesting the effectiveness of 
Scandinavian social and family services in reducing a wide range of social 
problems, from NEETs to teenage births, from crime to mental health. 
While this is not a cheap option it shows that the costs of not preventing are 
higher. Indeed it advocates social bonds to finance social and family 
services without tax costs, redeemable over a ten year period (see also 
Mulgan et al 2011). 
 
However, the dominant strategy remains secondary prevention. Some of 
the implications of this strategy, such as devolving and pooling resources 
across sectors at the local level are now being discussed. On the other 
hand, several of the necessary neighbourhood programmes instigated by 
New Labour have been abolished by the Coalition government which will 
make this more difficult. 
Conclusion 
At the most general level, we can conclude that discourses of prevention 
have proliferated within health, crime and early years intervention over the 
last three decades. This period coincided with the maturation of the welfare 
state and continual attempts to manage its long-term cost pressures. This 
situation of ‘growth to limits’ is now overlaid by unprecedented short-term 
cuts to manage fiscal crises brought about by the financial crash. These 
trends make more salient the theoretical case for prevention. But in practice 
this has been derailed by powerful ideological, interest-based and 
institutional forces. In all three fields, secondary prevention has been 
favoured over primary prevention, for ideological and cost-measurement 
reasons, and again because it has been in the interest of dominant players 
and institutions. Where, as in crime, primary prevention strategies have 
been developed they have adopted a technical rather than social form of 
interventionism. Finally, extreme austerity policies are fostering new 
incentive-based practices of payment-by-results which may use, but 
subvert, the idea of prevention. 
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Environmental policy: preventing climate change 
The domain of environmental policy is quite different. It is potentially 
enormous, covering pollution of air, water and land, species extinction, 
threats to global resources, including oil, water and food supplies, and 
much more. I will concentrate only on the threat of climate change. In the 
words of the Stern Review (2007: 25) climate change is a new risk that is 
‘big, global, long-term, persistent and uncertain’; it poses ‘a truly complex 
and diabolical policy problem’ (Steffen 2011; cf. Garnaut 2008).  
Let us return to Freeman’s two foundations for preventive public policy. The 
first, scientific understanding of cause and effects and the possibility of 
prediction, is very difficult given, inter alia, the complexity of the global 
climate system, the inherent problems in predicting the effects of a unique, 
rapid, one-off shift in the parameters, and the complexity of the causal 
chain linking global warming to human welfare, illustrated in a much 
simplified form in the diagram below: 
 
Economic activity → 
Energy consumption →   
Greenhouse gas emissions →  
GHG cumulative concentrations → 
Global temperature → 
Regional climate change →  
Impact on human habitats → 
Social well-being 
 
Yet despite all this there is a global scientific consensus growing stronger 
over time, martialled by the formidable reports of the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007). This is challenged by powerful 
‘climate denial’ interests and in parts of the media, yet, contrary to 
expectations, this sceptical current has made little headway in terms of 
public opinion in the West with the exception of three outlier countries: the 
US, Canada and Australia. The great majority of Britons believe that 
climate change is happening and is caused by human activity; but it has 
low salience compared with other issues. 
 
Freeman’s second foundation is governmental capacity for controlled 
intervention. On the face of it, this too is remarkably problematic. Climate 
change is a global phenomenon, yet no authoritative global agency has 
such a capacity, nor can any other supra-national agencies approach the 
task. Climate change is an intergenerational issue posing threats into the 
very long term, far longer than the scope of any existing public policies 
(except possibly some forms of military and key resource planning). Yet all 
political systems, and notably western representative democracies, are 
challenged when addressing such inter-generational issues. Climate 
change is cumulative, so that short-term, high-cost measures are 
necessary to forestall vaguer, but potentially enormous, future costs. And 
there is much uncertainty about all the variables. Thus one would expect 
little motivation or capacity by national governments to implement serious 
preventive strategies. 
 
The record is mixed and the only binding global agreement, Kyoto, is quite 
inadequate. Yet national primary prevention policies do exist. The EU has 
put in place the world’s most ambitious cap-and-trade programme, the 
12 
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Emissions Trading System (ETS). And the UK Climate Change Act 2009 is 
remarkably radical: a commitment to cut GHG emissions by 80% by 2050, 
with tough intermediate five-year targets, set in legally binding form, and 
with a statutory body, the Climate Change Committee, charged to monitor 
progress. This amounts to unprecedented preventive strategy. The UK 
strategy is complex; its three main goals are to price emissions via the ETS 
and a range of caps and mandated energy policies, to promote clean 
energy, and to improve energy efficiency notably in homes via a range of 
targets and incentives (Gough 2012). Our climate mitigation commitments 
even led to the development of the first national plan since the 1960s – the 
UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2008). Rather than planning for 
growth in outputs it plans for cuts in carbon and GHGs, but it contains all 
the features of state planning: goals, targets, costing of alternative 
scenarios, sectoral breakdowns, timelines, policy proposals and incentive 
systems. 
 
I leave aside for the moment the issue of whether all this will be 
implemented – see Michael Jacobs’ contribution to the debate. But let me 
begin by using my framework to try to understand why such a radical – and 
so far cross-party – commitment has been put in place. 
Ideas and ideology 
As noted above, scientific consensus is quite solid and increasing over 
time. This is not the situation as portrayed in the media, but it does reflect a 
consensus among opinion formers and the public in the UK and across 
Europe, with some critical voices, such as Nigel Lawson’s Global Warming 
Policy Foundation. Most surveys show public opinion in Western countries 
to be ambivalent – wishing to protect the earth’s environment but unwilling 
to pay a significant price to achieve this. There has been some increase in 
climate change scepticism in the UK since 2005 and overall levels of 
concern about the issue have also fallen, as have risk perceptions (Gough 
2011). However, outside of the US, scepticism about man-made climate 
change and disinterest in mitigation policies does not approach a majority 
position. In a few other Western countries, notably the US and Australia, 
the ‘issue framing’ of climate change has generated strongly polarised 
positions – it has become a crucial ‘ideological marker’ (Christoff and 
Eckersley 2011). These discourses interact with a particular configuration 
of actors, interest and institutions in each jurisdiction. 
Interests. 
Commercial interests in coal, oil and high energy-using industries, 
especially in the US, are funding vigorous public ‘information’ and lobbying 
campaigns to denigrate climate change science, some of which spill over 
into the UK. Against this a green agenda is advanced, from above and 
below. On the one hand, there has been an ‘efflorescence of non-state 
activism’: protest groups, counter-cultural movements, the green party, 
environmental social movements, transition towns and suchlike (Lipschutz 
and Mckendry 2011). On the other hand, the interests of elites in reform 
can shift. Sectors of business understand the opportunities in green 
products and processes. Political elites understand the social costs of 
unplanned growth. These reformist elites will conflict with representatives of 
‘carboniferous capitalism’ and libertarian politicians, yet to date the 
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Institutions. 
A range of ministries have responsibilities within the climate change field, 
including Business and Transport, but two new ones have been 
established: DEFRA in 2001 and a separate Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) in 2008. There are several possible explanations 
for these new institutional developments in ‘environmental state activity’. 
Unlike social policy there was no prior fiscal burden to be financed: the core 
programmes of climate change mitigation have required little public 
expenditure so far (Marden and Gough 2011). The commitment rather is to 
capital spending, and inter-departmental coordination and planning. 
Moreover, within programmes to reduce emissions there is a substantial 
prospective role for the private sector, and within public policy for market-
based mechanisms, which undermines some political opposition (Gough 
2011). 
 
There is cross-national evidence that institutional patterns of interest 
representation affect the adoption of climate mitigation policies. Corporatist 
rather than pluralist political systems and proportional representation rather 
than first-past-the post electoral systems enable leading EU countries, 
notably Germany, and the EU itself to advance an alternative strategy of 
accumulation, based on aggressive carbon constraints, green technology 
and green growth (Christoff and Eckersley 2011). These comparative 
findings make the  cabon mitigation commitments of UK governments 
difficult to understand. I would explain them in terms of: the UK’s advanced 
de-industrialisation, which means there are few powerful business or trade 
union interests strongly opposed to carbon mitigation; the cumulated huge 
trade deficits which offshores a growing part of UK emissions; and the 
opportunities opened to the City of London in carbon trading and other 
climate-related financial activities.  
 
Finally, however, there is evidence that the economic depression has 
lowered concern for climate change and strengthened pressures for short-
term remedies. 
 
To summarise this brief survey. The threat of climate change calls for a 
preventive GHG reduction strategy in Western countries; but estimating 
causal effects and developing the capacity to intervene are daunting. Yet 
we find ambitious mitigation targets and programmes in place including in 
the UK. Some ideological, interest-based and institutional explanations are 
offered for this anomaly. Nevertheless, the findings suggest that 
implementation and delivery will be very problematic, especially in the UK, 
where dominant ideas and institutions oppose the level of state intervention 
that will be necessary (Gough 2011). This returns us to the economy, 
current economic models and styles of economic management. 
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Economic policy and management 
Preventive economic policy is not much discussed as such. An online 
search of ‘prevention’ and ‘economic policy’ revealed a large number of 
studies of the influence of economic policy and economic performance on 
the effectiveness of prevention numerous other domains: obesity and 
health, famine, inequality, group conflicts, peace-building, disaster 
prevention etc. But there were relatively few on prevention as a goal within 
economic policy and management – the major exception being proposals to 
prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent economic 
depression. 
 
This may be a result of different terminologies. But it also reflects the 
domination of economics by ideologies – in the sense of combined 
normative and explanatory views of the world. Thus I begin by exploring the 
paradigm clash and ideological transition around 1980 in some detail, 
before briefly noting the underlying role played by interests and institutions 
in this shift. 
 
Ideologies. 
Economic policy and management is riven by the clash between the 
competing paradigms of neo-classicism and Keynesianism, or some forms 
of ‘Keynes-plus’. Neo-classicism or neo-liberalism displaced Keynesianism 
in the late 1970s and remains the dominant economic paradigm across the 
OECD if not the globe. The extraordinary financial crisis has done little to 
dent its hegemony. A brief history of these paradigm shifts will need to be 
rehearsed (drawing notably on Peter Hall 1993, Robert Skidelsky 2009, and 
Adair Turner 2012). 
 
Keynesianism dominated until the mid-1970s, and it founded what could be 
regarded as a precautionary, preventive style of economic management. 
Fiscal and monetary policy was to be used to maintain aggregate demand 
and near-full employment, with resulting social and economic benefits. The 
automatic stabilisers of tax and welfare spending could be regarded as 
primary preventive economic mechanisms. 
 
However, as Hall (1993) demonstrates, anomalies within this system began 
to accumulate, notably the combination of stagnation and inflation, which 
posed great challenges to the Keynesian paradigm, first its instruments and 
techniques, and ultimately its goals. After a period of what Hall calls both 
‘puzzling’ and ‘powering’ it was displaced, initially in the English-speaking 
world, with what I will call for short neo-liberalism. 
 
It is useful to distinguish two ‘counter-revolutions’ here: Hayekism and neo-
classical economics, both with profound implications for Freeman’s twin 
bases of preventive economic management. Hayek’s (1976) philosophical 
foundations of markets as catallaxy and society as a spontaneous order 
rules out the possibility that society or its representatives could understand 
the causal connections essential for preventive public policies. Social 
explanation is impossible. Furthermore, should the state try to intervene in 
markets to prevent harm, this would be coercive, since the constraints on 
market actors’ opportunities would be intentional, as compared to the 
results of market forces themselves (Plant et al 1980). 
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The second, neo-classical counter-revolution moved further away from 
Keynes’s economics than ever before. These new theories abolish the 
distinction between uncertainty and risk, abandon the idea of a distinct 
macro-economic method, and advance the belief that markets are 
powerfully self-stabilizing. ‘Rarely in history can such powerful minds have 
devoted themselves to such strange ideas’ (Skidelsky 2009: 109-110). With 
their triumph, government intervention in numerous areas of the economy 
was rolled back, contracting-out and quasi-markets spread in social policy, 
cap-and-trade and market incentives spread in climate mitigation, 
privatisation and deregulation ruled in economic policy. Skidelsky and many 
others have demonstrated the role of this model in bringing about the 2008 
crisis. 
 
Where did this leave preventive economic policy, and notably primary 
prevention? In a series of influential writings, Majone (1994) argues that a 
new form of policy-making, the ‘regulatory state’, emerged to complement 
the shift towards a privatised economy. Its goal was to rectify market 
failures, notably the abuse of monopoly power and excessive externalities. 
This might be thought to offer the prospect of a new form of preventive 
economic management. However, Majone himself argued that the sole 
normative justification for such intervention is, and should be, efficiency: to 
improve positive-sum outputs for the economy as a whole. This required 
regulation by expert agencies – the Ofgems, Ofwats and Ofcoms of today’s 
world – themselves increasingly removed from democratic oversight as 
autonomous agencies. This regulatory structure is not conducive to joined-
up thinking in economic management. Nor can efficiency objectives be 
separated in practice from equity or sustainability goals and dealt with in a 
separate box. For example, providing incentives to energy companies to 
increase renewables by raising energy charges hurts lower income 
households the most. 
 
Following the 2008 crisis the case for a reinvented Keynesianism, or rather 
of a new paradigm which embraces but moves beyond Keynes, is re-
emerging. Recognising the radical uncertainty of the future provides the 
starting point for an alternative paradigm. According to Keynes, capitalism, 
as the engine of accumulation, itself exacerbates this uncertainty. From this 
it follows that government should exercise the capacity to pursue 
precautionary policies. Such preventive economic policies would include: 
taming finance, via substantial re-structuring of financial markets; an active 
macro-economic management; and the socialisation of considerable 
sectors of investment. Turner (2012) argues that governments should seek 
to maximise stability not growth, and he goes further in making explicit 
distinctions between good and harmful, or ‘socially useless’, economic 
activity. 
 
I would argue that there is a pressing case to develop a preventive 
economic strategy along these lines but extending beyond them to 
embrace wellbeing and sustainability as central goals. The investment 
aspect of social policy would be emphasised, and new ways of ‘valuing 
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However, the discussion so far has remained in the domain of ideas and 
ideologies and has not recognised the role of interests, institutions and 
power. There is not the space here to treat this properly, but a few words 
are needed. 
Interests. 
Neo-liberalism serves the interests of powerful capitalist agents, and in turn 
strengthens their power. Crouch (2011) argues that it serves the interests 
of giant corporations, which are ‘more potent than states or markets’. This 
power is based on both structure (their ability to engage in ‘regime 
shopping’ within a globalising world economy) and agency (their capacity 
and willingness to put vast funds into lobbying, political funding etc.) The 
end result is no less than the ‘capture’ of governments by corporations, a 
process beginning in the US. For others, including Glyn (2006) and 
Dumenil and Levy (2011), it is the financial sector which drives neo-liberal 
policies and benefits most from them. As industry declines and is 
outsourced from the West, most notably in the UK, capitalism becomes 
financialised with numerous consequences. As a result, instability 
increases culminating in the 2008 crisis. But this only strengthens financial 
capital as it becomes more critical to national economic survival. 
Institutions. 
Thus governments, starting with the American and British, become more 
beholden to these private and sectional interests and ideas. Indeed, 
governments and capital become more entwined and the ability of 
democracy to temper this is eroded as ‘winner-takes-all politics’ takes over 
(Hacker and Pierson 2010). The state in democratic capitalism is always 
torn between two conflicting principles of resource allocation: ‘merit’ and 
marginal productivity, or social need. But in this scenario the claims of 
social need are side-lined (Streeck 2010), beginning and most notably in 
liberal market economies dominated by financial interests, such as the UK.  
Conclusion 
If this general argument is true, the obstacles to equitable and sustainable 
social and environmental policies, including longer-term preventive policies, 
are profound. They are located in the economy, sustained by neo-liberal 
ideology, and reinforced by the private interests and institutions that benefit 
from them. 
 
In different areas of social policy, prevention discourse flourishes, mainly 
fostered by cost concerns of large welfare states, now facing enormous 
cuts. However, most policy is directed to secondary prevention and the 
alteration of individual and family behaviours, rather than to larger social 
structures. This is the result of dominant ideas which undermine the rational 
case for coherent longer-term social interventions, ideas that are in turn 
maintained by powerful interests and institutional biases. 
 
In environmental policy, specifically climate change mitigation, we find a 
contrasting and paradoxical picture. Despite the manifold knowledge and 
capacity problems in mitigating future global warming, a reasonably 
coherent primary prevention strategy is emerging in the EU including the 
UK. However, the cross-national evidence suggests this is likely to be more 
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In economic policy and management, the global dominance of neo-liberal 
ideas, economic models and values blocks the emergence of an alternative 
strategy for an equitable and sustainable social economy. Preventive 
initiatives in the economy, society and environment are having to be built in 
an atmosphere hostile to bold public initiatives. This hegemonic climate is 
supported by, and reinforces the power of, dominant corporate and 
financial interests. 
 
Thus the current economic model hinders the necessary regulatory, fiscal 
and mobilising initiatives within the public sphere which are essential, I 
would contend, for a coordinated social-environmental-economic preventive 
strategy of the sort that nef and others advocate. Within social policy, for 
example, contracting-out spawns and subsidises a growing network of 
private providers, and a new synthesis of private-interest government. 
Within climate change mitigation it has seen off effective carbon taxes and 
new public investment in eco-system maintenance (Helm 2009, Gough 
2011). 
 
There is growing cross-national evidence that supports this conclusion but 
qualifies it in important ways. Goodin and his colleagues (1999) have 
demonstrated in great detail that the social democratic forms of capitalism, 
typified in their study by the Netherlands, has outperformed the form of 
capitalism of the USA. This has occurred across all major socio-economic 
outcomes – poverty, inequality and social integration – with the German 
regime achieving a respectable second place. Their more recent work 
shows that the same pattern holds when looking at a healthy work-life 
balance, a balance which serves both social and environmental prevention 
goals (Goodin et al 2008). Comparative research of climate mitigation effort 
and outcomes by Christoff and Eckersley (2011) shows that the leaders in 
the developed world are the Nordic countries and Germany, and the clear 
‘laggards’ are the US, Canada and Australia. 
 
The conclusion is that there are potential synergies between radical 
preventive social and environmental policy, but these are only realisable in 
more coordinated forms of capitalism. This is a more hopeful conclusion. I 
develop some of these ideas further in the appendix. 
 
 
This essay was submitted as a working paper to a new economics 
foundation (nef) seminar on Prevention held in November 2012. The 
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Appendix: notes on an alternative 
social economy and effective 
prevention 
An alternative, preventive social-economic model needs to address, inter 
alia, three issues: the shibboleth of ‘consumer choice’, how to reach 
consensus on just and sustainable forms of preventive intervention, and the 
preconditions for integrated policy-making. 
 
1. Wants and needs. 
 
Hayek and neo-classical economics together helped cement the prime 
position of consumer sovereignty in economics and as a central, taken-for-
granted, normative stance in policy-making. We have seen how this has 
inhibited various strands of preventive public policy (with some hard-fought 
exceptions, such as smoking cessation). Yet all serious studies, by 
scholars in political science, law and behavioural sciences, demonstrate 
that consumer preferences are endogenous to socio-economic systems. 
Our wants are shaped by structures, interest groups and private and public 
institutions. Thus to proclaim respect for consumer choice as the taken-for-
granted foundation of preventive policy is to respect the current factors and 
forces shaping preferences as either optimal or unchangeable. This is 
rejected by scholars from a wide range of positions. ‘(In the face of current 
levels of obesity) it is quite fantastic to suggest that everyone is choosing 
the optimum diet, or the diet that is preferable to what might be produced 
with third-party guidance’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2006:237). ‘Any welfare 
approach based on the presumption that individuals are always the best 
judges of their own interest falls at the first hurdle: many people neither 
understand nor accept the conclusions of the science of climate change’ 
(Hodgson 2012). 
 
Thus it is essential to qualify the pursuit of want-regarding principles by 
ideal-regarding principles, to use Brian Barry’s terms. I have argued that 
human need provides just such an alternative measure of value (Doyal and 
Gough 1991). Sen and Nussbaum proclaim capabilities and functionings. 
There are differences between these concepts, but they are less important 
than the challenge all offer to Barry’s ‘want-regarding principles’. In 
developing these alternative value measures, disciplines other than 
economics will play a powerful role, one which has been displaced in recent 
decades. Economics is by far the most dominant ‘epistemic community’ in 
the modern world, and economists such as Stiglitz, Turner and Skidelsky 
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recognise the harm this is doing. To develop more structural, primary forms 
of preventive policy, the full range of social (and historical) sciences need to 
play a greater public role. 
 
2. Codified and local knowledge. 
In determining the evidence for making preventive interventions, two sorts 
of knowledge must be tapped. First, there is the best available codified 
knowledge, including scientific/ technical knowledge of causal relationships 
between human need satisfaction and other factors, and comparative 
anthropological knowledge about practices across cultures and sub-
cultures, states and political systems in the contemporary world. Second, is 
the experientially grounded knowledge of people. If upstream interventions 
are to be negotiated, all groups must have the ability to participate in 
research into need satisfiers and to contribute to policy-making. ‘Preventing 
harm is arguably most effective when it involves change from the bottom 
up: people and organisations becoming more resilient: building up their own 
immune systems, both literally and metaphorically, so that they become 
less susceptible to harm; changing attitudes and capabilities so that they 
are better able to withstand harm by taking positive actions themselves’ 
(Nef 2012:18).  
 
Thus any rational and effective attempt to resolve disputes over ways of 
improving the satisfaction of human needs, including preventive action, 
must bring to bear both the codified knowledge of experts and the 
experiential knowledge of those whose basic needs and daily life world are 
under consideration. It ‘requires a dual strategy of policy formation which 
values compromise, provided that it does not extend to the general 
character of basic human needs and rights’ (Doyal and Gough 1991:141). 
This ‘dual strategy’ calls for new forms of participatory processes and 
deliberative dialogue, already much explored and piloted in numerous 
areas of life.  
 
It is not inconsistent to extol the virtues of participation while being 
extremely critical of actually existing representative democracy, as the Nef 
report recognises: ‘While the processes of preventing harm may well be 
more effective if they are participative … the politics of prevention offers a 
formidable challenge to democracy, perhaps especially where the 
environment is concerned’. Quite apart from the domination by powerful 
lobbies, the decline of value-based political parties results in a 
representative democracy built on aggregating preferences, as expressed 
in ‘median voter’ theories. The alternative advanced here promotes 
deliberative democracy in the determination of needs and need-satisfying 
policies, which may, as argued above, contradict current consumer and 
voter preferences. 
 
3. Preconditions for a preventive policy-making. 
A sustainable social economy can be defined as one whose overriding 
goals are to provide an optimum pattern of need satisfiers for the current 
population without threatening the need satisfiers available for future 
generations. This requires certain procedural and material preconditions 
(Doyal and Gough 1991, ch 11; Gough 2000 ch2). To discuss just the 
procedural preconditions here: these refer to the ability of a nation (which I 
shall take as the relevant economic unit at this stage) to define basic needs 
and appropriate need satisfiers in a rational way and to prioritise the need 
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satisfactions of different groups, including future generations. These 
preconditions entail that the composition of output in an economy becomes 
as much an object of policy as its size and distribution. Following Baumol 
(1990) and Turner we should foster a principled debate on the distinctions 
between productive, unproductive (including distributive) and destructive 
outputs in the economy. This returns us to much earlier discussions of 
productive and unproductive labour, of luxuries and necessities, of inputs 
essential for reproducing people, communities and ecologies. 
 
Using this framework I have tried to evaluate the ability of three forms of 
capitalism to achieve these preconditions: neo-liberal capitalism, statist 
capitalism, and corporatist capitalism (Gough 2000, chapter 2). My 
conclusion is that neo-liberal capitalism fails to achieve the first 
precondition – to identify sustainable needs - indeed true neo-liberals glory 
in the fact that there is no central debate on or prioritisation of the goals of 
the economy. By frequently denying the existence or knowability of 
individual and social needs it cannot or will not challenge consumer 
demand except in isolated cases. Thus needs not backed up by relevant 
knowledge and/or purchasing power will go unmet. By deregulating 
markets to the maximum extent, the ability or consumer-citizens to define 
need satisfiers is also diminished. Democratic distortions are numerous and 
increasing, as financial and corporate power is unleashed and freed from 
democratic restraint. 
 
By contrast the ability of capitalism to meet material preconditions for 
human well-being is not to be dismissed. Markets can utilise the dispersed 
knowledge of millions of separate actors to achieve historic improvements 
in material standards of living. Against that, there is a need to counteract 
the well-established litany of market failures; to regulate and redistribute 
incomes to prevent soaring inequality; to protect consumers against the 
power of commercial lobbies and advertisers; and to prevent degradation of 
future natural resource stocks via regulation of property rights, preservation 
of stocks of natural capital and fostering of longer-term time horizons. Even 
in the most deregulated forms of capitalism governments will pursue some 
of these forms of regulation; but the continual pressure under neo-
liberalism is to undermine them or roll them back altogether, as the 
disciples of Ayn Rand now demand in America. 
 
Thus my conclusion is that neo-liberal capitalism may be an effective 
system for satisfying the wants of some people in the present by means of 
commodities. It cannot provide a framework for a sustainable social 
economy. One reason for this is that it cannot foster longer-term, preventive 
social planning. We need to study and evaluate alternative forms of 
coordinated capitalism, as they exist in Europe, and as they emerge across 
the developing world. 
 
